

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 02311

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PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY VANCE FROM HARRIMAN AND YOUNG

E.O.11652:GDS
TAGS: PARM, UNGA
SUBJECT: SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD)

1. SUMMARY: THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN OUR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES VIEW OUR LACK OF POSITIVE RESPONSE AT THE SPECIAL SESSION TO THEIR REQUEST FOR (A) FIRM NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES AND (B) A COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO EXPLORE MORE STEPS TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AS BEING A FAILURE OF THE US TO TAKE AN AFFIRMATIVE POSITION AS REQUIRED BY OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT. THIS TELEGRAM EXPRESSES OUR VIEWS AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION. THE CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS WISH TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS TO THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY; SOME OF THEM REGARD THESE STEPS AS MINIMAL AND WISH TO GO FURTHER. IF YOU AGREE, WE BELIEVE THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT. WE ARE PARTICULARLY MINDFUL THAT THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAS BEEN A STRONG AND DETERMINED ADVOCATE OF NON-PROLIFERATION AGAINST ALL OBSTACLES. END SUMMARY.

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2. BRIEFLY PUT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE FAILURE OF THE US TO TAKE AN AFFIRMATIVE POSITION IN THE SPECIAL SESSION PRECLUDES US FROM ADVANCING IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES IN NON-PROLIFERATION, AND SERIOUSLY RISKS OUR BEING ISOLATED FROM ALMOST ALL OUR FRIENDS. WE FULLY APPRECIATE THE PURPOSES OF VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE'S SPEECH DELIVERED PRIOR TO THE NATO SUMMIT, YET THE DELEGATION HAS BEEN COMPELLED TO RE-

PORT THAT THE INITIAL REACTION BY THE MAJORITY OF THE DELEGATIONS ASSEMBLED WAS ONE OF DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT. OUR SUBSEQUENT SOUNDINGS WITH BOTH ALLIED AND NON-ALIGNED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONFIRMED THIS INITIAL IMPRESSION. THE ABSENCE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT INITIATIVES AND THE HEAVY EMPHASIS ON THE WARSAW PACT-NATO CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE HAVE BEEN CITED BY SERIOUS OBSERVERS AS FAILING TO SET A CONSTRUCTIVE TONE. BUT THE PROBLEM IS MORE THAN SIMPLY ATMOSPHERIC. THERE IS STILL TIME TO ALTER THE COURSE ON WHICH WE HAVE SET AND TO RECAPTURE SOME MEASURE OF LEADERSHIP WHICH WILL ALLOW US TO ADVANCE OUR GOALS ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL GENERALLY.

3. RECURRING THEMES IN THE SPEECHES OF MOST OF THE NON-NUCLEAR STATES, INCLUDING SUCH INFLUENTIAL COUNTRIES AS BRAZIL, YUGOSLAVIA, JAPAN AND VENEZUELA, HAVE BEEN:

1) A DESIRE TO SEE POSITIVE SIGNS OF PROGRESS TOWARD CUTTING BACK THE SIZE OF THE NUCLEAR ARSENALS 2) SOME ASSURANCES, SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES THAT THEY WILL NOT BE SUBJECTED TO NUCLEAR ATTACK AND 3) GREATER ACCESS BY THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. OF COURSE, WE CANNOT SATISFY THE WISHES OF ALL STATES ON ALL THESE POINTS. THE DELEGATION BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT WE CAN STILL TAKE STEPS IN THE DIRECTION OF ACCOMMODATING THESE DESIRES AT LITTLE COST
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AND POTENTIALLY HIGH GAIN.

4. IF WE COULD GO SOME WAY TOWARD MEETING THESE THREE SPECIFIC CONCERNS, WE WOULD NOT ONLY MARKEDLY IMPROVE THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE BUT, MORE IMPORTANT, WE WOULD HELP ACHIEVE ONE OF OUR MAJOR OBJECTIVES HERE, THAT OF STRENGTHENING THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. THE NON-ALIGNED ARGUE THAT IN COMPENSATION FOR THEIR RENOUNCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE NPT, THEY WERE TO RECEIVE CERTAIN BENEFITS:

-- ENHANCED SECURITY

-- ASSISTANCE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IN DEVELOPING THEIR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS (ART. IV) AND

-- AN END TO THE VERTICAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (ART. VI).

WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF JUSTIFICATION THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES ARGUE THAT WHILE THEY ARE FULFILLING THEIR OBLIGATIONS, THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES HAVE NOT

DONE ENOUGH TO FULFILL THEIRS. THE 1975 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE IS LOOKED ON WITH CONSIDERABLE BITTERNESS. WITH THE SECOND NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE LOOMING IN 1980, THE TREATY WILL BE IN REAL TROUBLE UNLESS THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES MAKE SOME TANGIBLE MOVES IN THE INTERIM TO LIVE UP TO THEIR TREATY UNDERTAKINGS AS THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PERCEIVE THOSE UNDERTAKINGS. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN PUT TO US VERY FORCEFULLY AT THIS SPECIAL SESSION BY, AMONG OTHERS, THE INDIANS, YUGOSLAVS AND MEXICANS.

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5. TWO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO OUR GUIDANCE WOULD DO A GREAT DEAL TO STEM THE EROSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE NPT WITHOUT IN OUR VIEW ADVERSELY AFFECTING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY OR ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS:

(1) AN OFFER OF ADDITIONAL SECURITY ASSURANCES TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES ALONG THE LINES OF THE FORMULATION WE AND THE BRITISH WERE CONSIDERING BEFORE THE SSOD BEGAN;

(2) ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSITION THAT AFTER THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF SALT II AND CTB THE US WOULD BE READY TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON ADDITIONAL MEASURES LEADING TOWARD SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING A CUTOFF OF THE PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR EXPLOSIVE PURPOSES AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

6. IN REGARD TO NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES, WE ARE

THE ONLY NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE NOT TO OFFER SOME FORM
OF ASSURANCE TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. THE PASSAGE
IN THE VICE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH REPEATING THE PRESIDENT'S
STATEMENT OF LAST OCTOBER IS IN EFFECT A RESTATEMENT
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OF OUR UNDERTAKINGS UNDER THE UN CHARTER TO USE FORCE
ONLY IN SELF-DEFENSE. IT DOES NOT FILL THE BILL.
OUR NATO ALLIES AND JAPAN, AS WELL AS THE PRINCIPAL
NON-ALIGNED REPRESENTATIVES, HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT
THEY WOULD LIKE US TO COME FORWARD WITH AN APPROPRIATE
FORM OF NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCE. IN FACT THE
BRITISH AND THE GERMANS HAVE TOLD US THEY WERE TAKEN
ABACK BY OUR FAILURE TO COME FORWARD WITH A FULLER
FORMULATION AT THIS SESSION.

7. PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN IN AN EXTRAORDINARILY WELL
RECEIVED SPEECH DELIVERED ON JUNE 2 ADDRESSED THE
QUESTION OF SECURITY ASSURANCES IN A FORTHRIGHT MANNER.
AFTER RECALLING BRITAIN'S ENDORSEMENT OF PRESIDENT
CARTER'S OCTOBER STATEMENT ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, CALLAGHAN WENT ON TO SAY, "I RECOGNIZE HOWEVER,
THAT STATES WHICH HAVE RENOUNCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE
ENTITLED TO LOOK FOR SOME MORE SPECIFIC ASSURANCE
THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE USED AGAINST THEM.
MY COUNTRY ACKNOWLEDGES THESE EXPECTATIONS AND WANTS
ACTION TO MEET THEM. IN FEBRUARY WE PROPOSED THAT
THE MATTER SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AT THIS SPECIAL SESSION.

I PLACE ON RECORD THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL BE
PREPARED ITSELF TO TAKE PART WITH OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS
IN FIRM, FAR-REACHING AND PERMANENT ASSURANCES TO
THE NON-NUCLEAR STATES."

THIS STRONG STATEMENT CLEARLY PUTS US IN AN ISOLATED
POSITION AMONG NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

8. ON FURTHER STEPS TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, THE
SOVIETS HAVE PUT THEMSELVES IN A STRONG POSITION WITH
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THEIR CALL FOR A PREPARATORY CONFERENCE ON THE CESSATION
OF THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS--DESPITE ITS
EVIDENT PROPAGANDISTIC CHARACTER. THUS ON THE MAIN ISSUES
RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
IT IS WE WHO ARE SEEN AS BEING UNRESPONSIVE AND IT IS

WE WHO WILL BE BLAMED IF THE SPECIAL SESSION IS UNABLE TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS ON THESE CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE PROGRAM OF ACTION WHICH IT WILL ADOPT.

9. IN OUR JUDGMENT, IF THE US CAN BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON THE TWO QUESTIONS OF SECURITY ASSURANCES AND FURTHER STEPS TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, WE WILL NOT ONLY IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME AT THE SPECIAL SESSION BUT WILL STRENGTHEN THE NPT AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESS OF US NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS IN GENERAL. IF, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS ON THESE CRITICAL ISSUES, WE WILL BE FORCED TO A VOTE IN WHICH WE WILL HAVE VERY FEW SHARING OUR POSITIONS. THERE WILL THEN BE A RESIDUE OF BITTERNESS AT THE END OF THIS SESSION THAT WILL NOT ONLY HURT OUR NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORT BUT WILL SPILL OVER INTO OTHER AREAS, IN PARTICULAR NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS.

10. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ISSUES RAISED IN THIS MESSAGE MERIT THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL ATTENTION. YOUNG

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